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Improving Regulatory Performance: 










  Executive Office review and oversight of proposed federal regulations have been 
a bipartisan action of presidents and some governors.  Proposals for regulatory 
improvement regularly highlight the role of benefit-cost analysis in this process.  
Supporters argue that the purpose of a benefit-cost review is to improve the social (net) 
benefits of implemented regulations.  The evaluation question is whether Executive 
Office review has actually improved performance. 
   
  This paper uses information on the status of regulations and their estimated 
economic impact to determine if Executive Office review has changed the outcome in 
different Administrations.  The study is based on cost-effectiveness data that have had a 
large role in the debate about regulation and while an extensive critique of the data exists, 
its issues are addressed. 
 
  The results indicate that while Executive Office review is associated with 
rejecting some regulations that would have been economically inefficient, such review 
appears to have no efficiency improving impact on the difference between proposed and 
final regulations or on the cost effectiveness of regulations that are implemented.    
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1.0 Issues and Background 
 
 
Improving governmental performance is a bipartisan objective.  At the Federal 
level, each Administration for over 25 years has required agencies to submit material on 
the expected performance of regulations as part of a review process in the Executive 
Office of the President (e.g. Executive Orders 11949, 12044, 12291, 12866).  While some 
research exists on regulatory performance (e.g. Morrall, 1986; Hahn, 1996) relatively less 
attention has been devoted to evaluating the bureaucratic processes designed to improve 
regulatory performance.  In particular, this paper investigates whether Executive Office 
oversight improves the economic performance of regulation.  Such investigation is 
particularly relevant as the substance of Executive Office review has surfaced in 
legislative proposals and could also be applied to agency performance under the 
Governmental Performance and Results Act. 
Federal regulations are typically developed through processes identified in the 
Administrative Procedures Act.  The regulatory process leads to legally binding rules that 
are a central means by which Government regulates the economy, the environment, 
health, safety, and a variety of other activities. The prototypical (informal) regulatory 
process involves: statutory delegation to an agency to develop a rule, internal agency 
development, internal administration review, release for public comment leading to 
possible revisions, and in many cases, judicial review following final publication.  While 
courts may guard the process, the performance outcome of the process is amenable to 
quantitative analysis.    4
Unfortunately, the performance society wants from a regulation is ambiguous as 
society speaks with many voices.  Various attributes of regulation have been identified as 
desirable, including substantive efficacy, economic efficiency, equity, transparency, and 
so on (NAPA, 1995; OTA, 1995).  While society may want a complex mixture of these 
attributes, a substantial amount of current policy interest focuses on issues of risk and 
benefit-cost analysis, which can be viewed as elements of substantive efficacy and 
economic efficiency.  Benefit-cost analysis in turn provides the core of official review 
criteria for regulation within the Executive Office of the President, with recent changes 
providing for concern about the impacts on small business and minorities. 
This paper investigates the quantitative impact on regulatory performance of 
changes in Executive Office review of regulations, as implemented by the establishment 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  The primary units of measurement 
are those regulations that become law while attention is also devoted to regulations that 
are withdrawn, rejected or proposed.     
 
2.0  Regulatory Evaluation: Process and Performance 
 
Presidents since the 1970s have issued Executive Orders that call for analysis of 
the benefits and costs of major regulations.  The Executive Orders attempt to create an 
Executive Branch performance criteria for regulations from all agencies.  While the 
criteria are not currently actionable by law in the absence of statutory direction, they do 
address accountability in the political arena where the President and Vice-President are 
the only elected officials in the Executive Branch. 
    A watershed in presidential guidance on regulatory performance was Executive 
Order 12291, issued in 1981 right after President Reagan took office.  That Order called   5
for Federal agencies to prepare economic analyses that to the extent practicable calculate 
benefits and costs of major rules on a comparable monetized footing.  It further required 
that agencies should promulgate regulations only if the benefits “outweigh” costs, unless 
this explicit and quantitative balancing was precluded by the underlying statute.  These 
analyses are processed and reviewed in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
President Clinton in 1993 issued Executive Order 12866 which, along with a 
newly revised guidance document, retained most of the specific analytical requirements 
for major rules.  However, this later Order stipulated that benefits should “justify” costs 
and that the choice among alternative regulatory approaches should “maximize net 
benefits unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.”  Analyses should take into 
account a variety of quantitative and qualitative factors, including distributional 
considerations (impacts on different groups) and factors that might be difficult to 
monetize.  Consistent with this altered “decision criterion,” the Order and the guidelines 
issued by OMB put increased emphasis on the calculation of distributional impacts and 
the assessment of qualitative as well as quantitative factors. The performance concept 
was not much changed however; the agencies are to show that regulations can meet an 
economic performance test. 
Most existing reviews of OIRA tend to be descriptive (McGarity, 1991; Shane, 
1995; Morgenstern, 1997; U.S. GAO, 1998) and involve perceptions of participants at 
various parts of the process.  The approach followed here assesses the statistical evidence 
for an impact of OIRA on economic measures of performance.  The point of departure is 
an important data set prepared by John Morrall, first released in 1986, presenting the 
cost-per-life saved for various regulations.  As surveyed by Heinzerling (1995), these 
data were widely interpreted as evidence of performance failure based on the lack of cost 
effectiveness and efficiency in federal health and safety regulations.  The evidence for the 
lack of cost-effectiveness (least cost to achieve a given goal) was that the data covered a   6
range of cost-per-life saved from .1 to 72 billion (1984) dollars.  Cost-effective 
regulation, with the implicit assumption that funds or regulatory powers are transferable 
across programs would require that cost-per-life-saved be equal for all regulations (or 
following some declining time trend if the least costly regulations are implemented first.)  
The spread in performance values suggested that more lives could be saved for less 
money by a different portfolio of regulations.   
Cost effectiveness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic 
efficiency and so other readers further interpreted the results as indicating a failure of 
economic efficiency. Instead of taking the goal (lives saved) as given, economic 
efficiency asks if the additional benefits equal the additional costs for each program.  If 
the additional benefits are primarily lives saved (on which there is more discussion 
below), then a commonly used measure of the economic benefit is the value of a 
statistical life.  While differing estimates of this value exist as surveyed by EPA (1997), 
typically ranging from 1 to 12 million (1990) dollars, various researchers identified 
regulations as efficient if they saved lives for less than a threshold amount and inefficient 
if the cost-per-life-saved exceeded the threshold.  The general findings of Morrall 
regarding cost effectiveness and economic inefficiency were upheld in a series of articles 
by Teng, et al. (1996) and Hahn (1996) who developed larger data sets. 
Heinzerling disputes the standard interpretation of the cost-per-life-saved numbers 
by focusing on the variety of legal outcomes that occurred, as some of the apparently 
expensive rules were never finalized, and on the method of calculating the performance 
measure—the cost-per-life-saved. 
This investigation relates to, but is separate from the questions of cost-
effectiveness and efficiency while needing to take into account the Heinzerling critique of 
the data.  The question asked here is whether regulatory performance improved with an 
OIRA review process?  This is important in part because advocates of regulatory 
improvement have sought to create a statute instead of Executive Order based   7
requirement for the benefit-cost review of regulations.  They seek an increase in the 
benefit-cost reporting of OIRA, and have considered the creation in Congress of 
institutions similar to OIRA. This evaluation of program evaluators might reasonably 
inform suggestions for reform.  The basic questions, developed more formally in the 
following section, are: 
 
•  Has Executive Office review changed the probability of rejection for high 
cost-per-life-saved regulations? 
•  Has Executive Office review changed the cost-per-life-saved for finalized 
regulations?  
•  Has Executive Office review changed the cost-per-life-saved between the 
officially proposed and the final version of a regulation? 
 
Foreshadowing later results, for all the sound and the fury about the role and impact 
of Executive Office review, the evidence is remarkably weak that OIRA has had a 
substantial quantitative impact.  While some may argue that the policy conclusion is to 
remove Executive Office review, this author will argue that a stronger dose is 
appropriate. 
 
3.0  Analytical Structure and Previous Work 
The statistical analysis of government regulatory decisionmaking has a small but 
vital literature, (e.g. McFadden 1976; Congleton, et. al., 1996).  Such analyses as exist 
typically use data sets about some performance measures of regulation, and seek to 
identify the statistical determinants of the outcome. This research generally has analyzed 
decisions within one program, such as hazardous site clean-ups under CERCLA, or a set 
of decisions within a single agency.  With reference to environmental regulation, various 
authors have analyzed the statistical determinants of decisions involving: 1) pesticide 
regulation (Cropper, et al., 1992), 2) superfund clean-ups (Viscusi and Hamilton, 1999),   8
3) water effluent regulation (Magat, Krupnick and Harrington, 1986), 4) air toxics (Van 
Houtven, 1996), and 5) government sales of environmentally sensitive petroleum 
resources among other applications (Farrow, 1991).  While various statistical models are 
fit to the data, for instance depending on whether the decision being analyzed is discrete 
(yes/no) or continuous (e.g. concentration limits in a standard), the basic approach is to 
ask if the outcome of a decision, D, depends statistically on some aspects of the process 
or information, X, while simultaneously taking into account other factors that might 
affect the outcome.  The resulting analysis identifies which factors are statistically 
associated with the decision, how large an impact a change in X has on the decision, and 
the overall predictive power of the statistical equation that links the Xs to D.   
Surprisingly, little statistical analysis has been done on the performance of 
regulation that cuts across agencies.  Executive Office review provides an opportunity for 
such a cross-cutting analysis.  Previously, Morrall simply computed some descriptive 
statistics of his sample while Heinzerling did not carry out any statistical analysis.  Hahn 
(1999) while extending the analysis of Morrall, primarily investigated a different set of 
questions.  In the bulk of his work, Hahn investigates whether the type of regulation 
(cancer, or not) or promulgating agency (EPA or not) is a determinant of the cost-per-
life-saved, while also testing for differences between his data set and that reported by 
Morrall.  In his analysis, the type of regulation, cancer or not, appears almost 
synonymous with Morrall’s focus on health-based regulations.  Hahn’s regression results 
lead him to the conclusion that rules focused on reducing cancer are less cost effective 
than others, an effect exacerbated in his analysis if the EPA promulgated the rule.  That 
line of questioning can indeed direct policy makers to question whether cancer (or health   9
in general) should be more or less tightly regulated and who should promulgate cancer 
(health) focused regulations.  However, they provide little guidance for the impact of 
regulatory review. 
A regression approach to the impact of Executive Office review of regulation 
seems to have first surfaced in preliminary results mentioned by Farrow and Toman 
(1999) and in an initial analysis by Hahn (1999). Those results indicated that the 
existence of OIRA did not significantly affect the cost effectiveness of final regulations.  
The results in this paper investigate additional questions regarding rules that are rejected, 
changes from proposed to final rules and the robustness of the prior findings that OIRA 
has not had an effect on the cost-effectiveness of regulation. 
The several models to be estimated are summarized here.  The first model 
concerns the hypothesis that Executive Office review alters the probability of rejection of 
a rule.  A rule is deemed “rejected” if it is proposed but is withdrawn or never 
implemented by the agency
1.  Such rejection might be considered a success for regulatory 
reformers if cost effectiveness data were important in their rejection and accurately 
measured.  This hypothesis refines the simple visual clues provided to a reader when 
final, proposed, and rejected rules have been lumped together in one table, as has been 
the standard practice.     
Briefly, define R as whether a rule is rejected or not.  Define X as a set of 
variables, including: the estimated cost effectiveness of the rule (C); “Reagan” and 
“Bush” as variables indicating each Administration; OIRA as the presence of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (since 1981); “Health ” as whether the rule is   10
focused on that issue (almost a perfect overlap with “cancer”); “EPA” as the agency; 
“Year” as the year of promulgation; and "Budget" as the budgets of relevant trade 
associations that were likely to oppose the rule.  A regretful statistical reality given the 
Morrall data is that the presence of OIRA, begun in 1981, exactly overlaps the 
Republican years of 1981 to 1992.  Thus, with the current data set, we cannot distinguish 
between the impact of OIRA and the Republican administrations
2 although a test for 
differences between the Republican Administrations can be implemented. 
A statistical approach to the rejection hypothesis is to use a Probit type of analysis 
which models a two outcome (rejected or not) situation as: 
R=1 (rejected)           if Y*> f(Xb) + e and Y* is an unobservable index of preference and 
where e is an error term, b are parameters 
 
   =0 (not rejected)        otherwise.  Here one asks if the presence of OIRA or the budgets 
of trade associations affected the probability rejections 
 
The second hypothesis is whether any Administration or the presence of OIRA 
reduced the cost-per-life-saved compared to what it would otherwise have been.  This is 
the extension of the preliminary results in Farrow and Toman, and in Hahn.  The 
structure of that model, where only data for final rules are included, is: 
C=f(Xb)+e  where e is a standard error term, b are parameters 
If an Administration or OIRA had an effect in reducing the cost-per-life-saved, 
then we would expect to see a negative relationship between those variables and cost-per-
life-saved. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 The case of rejection by the courts, as with Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA , 947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 
1991), took place after Executive Office Review.  Its rejection can be modeled if one asks about the entire 
regulatory system including agency development, executive office, and eventually, judicial review. 
2 In part, this paper can be viewed as an outline for OIRA to carry out its own updated analysis of statistical 
effectiveness.   11
Finally, we can ask if the cost-per-life-saved changed between the proposed and 
final rule(Cp –Cf)  as a function of the Administration or presence of OIRA. 
 
4.0  Data 
 
 
The data available for this analysis have been published in several forms, all with 
Morrall as a participant (Morrall, 1986; OMB, 1992; Viscusi, 1996; Lutter and Morrall, 
1994).  The data were the subject of an intensive critique by Heinzerling (1995).   A 
summary of the issues is presented here as the debate tends to break down along 
economist/non-economist lines.  Readers interested in further detail are referred to the 
original publications. 
John Morrall, an economist originally in the Council on Wage and Price Stability in 
the Carter Administration and later in the Office of the Management and Budget, 
prepared and updated a table (Morrall, 1986) that reports the cost-per-life-saved for 
individual regulation.  Various additional information was provided in the table (and its 
later extensions) including the originating agency, whether it was health or safety based, 
the year of the regulations, and its status such as “final,” “proposed” or “rejected.”  
Morrall reported some aspects of his calculations, such as being “generally based on 
agencies’ estimates at the time of decision,” “adjusted ..temporal variations u sing a 
uniform 10-percent discount rate for both benefits and costs,” and because “many 
regulations were projected to yield benefits in addition to saving lives, such as reducing 
non-fatal injuries and property damage.  I accounted for these additional benefits by 
subtracting monetary benefits from costs and converting non-lifesaving benefits into an 
index equivalent to additional lives saved, (Morrall, 1986, p. 27-28).”   The starting data   12
set for this study is a composite of four presentations of the data (comprising 73 
regulations from 1967 to 1991)
3.  As discussed below, some adjustment is made to the 
coding of 12 of those regulations including the deletion of 4 observations. 
In the absence of debate it may have been appropriate to use the data as published.  
However, Heinzerling’s critique raises five questions for users (and interpreters) of the 
data.  Those questions are: 1) overinclusion due to rules rejected, 2) overinclusion due to 
rules that do not exist, 3) underinclusion due excluded rules and the failure to regulate, 4) 
discounting, and 5) estimating risks.  Her careful review of various regulations led to 
some modification of the data for use in this study and where not modified, is worthy of a 
response.  Each point is taken in turn with respect to the data used for this analysis. 
 
4.1  Overinclusion and under inclusion 
An important element of Heinzerling’s critique is that data presented by Morrall both 
incorrectly includes and excludes some regulations.  Her first concern is with rules that 
are rejected, but her concern in this case appears to be less with the data per se but that 
their inclusion to reformers should imply a success of regulation and not a failure
4.   
The specific cases of concern to Heinzerling and their treatment in this paper are 
summarized in Table 1 (the other 61 cases remain as coded by Morrall and co-authors).  
For instance, the Asbestos regulation, which was finalized by the Administration but 
                                                 
3 The four presentations are: Morrall (1986); OMB (1992); Viscusi (1996); and Lutter and Morrall (1994).  
Related data sets exist, such as those by: Tengs, et al. (1996) which, as published, do not contain the 
additional information necessary for this analysis; Hahn (1999) who cites results from extending the 
Morrall data but has not published the data; and the Office of Management and Budget (1997-1999) who 
have changed their reporting methods so that the data are not readily comparable to those of Morrall.  As 
the Heinzerling critique is aimed at the Morrall data, and Hahn reports little statistical difference between 
his data and Morrall’s, the analysis is based on the Morrall data while anticipating that OMB or other 
researchers can and should carry out extensions of the analysis.   13
rejected by the court
5, is included as final for the purpose of assessing the impact of 
Administrations or OIRA.  Similarly, the data in front of EPA at the time of withdrawing 
three benzene related rules and two radionuclide regulations are included as information 
on “rejected” rules prior to any judicial process.  One Morrall observation excluded from 
this analysis is a regulatory alternative for Acrylonitrile that was one of several 
considered but never finalized.  If more observations of this kind were available, 
statistical tests could be conducted of the internal agency decision process (Cropper, et 
al., 1991; Hoagland and Farrow, 1996) but lacking comparable data it seems 
inappropriate to include secondary alternatives.   
The second concern of Heinzerling is with the inclusion of rules that “don’t exist” in 
the sense that they never became final.  These are included either as rejected rules or 
deleted from the data set as “alternatives” as summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Use of Disputed Regulations  





Various rejected rules  Rejected rules  Rejected rules  Basis of new test 
Asbestos  Rejected by court  Final  Passed administration 
Acrylonitrile (rejected)  Alternative  Not included   
Benzene (3)  Withdrawn by agency  Rejected   
Radionuclides (2)  Withdrawn by agency  Rejected   
Ethylene Dibromide  Never finalized  Rejected   
Arsenic Copper Smelter 
NESHAP 
One rejected  NESHAP 
included, other 
is deleted 
Agency withdrew rule 
due to closing of one 
plant to which it applied. 
Arsenic glass (2)  Rejected rule does not 
exist 
Not included   
Uranium mines  Withdrawn by agency  Rejected   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Heinzerling notes that her critique does not accept the rules as inefficient as she also disputes the   14
4.2  Underexclusion and failure to regulate 
  Heinzerling’s concern in this category is that some rules were promulgated and 
others “should be” promulgated but do not appear in Morrall’s tables.  Though 
Heinzerling mixes a variety of sources, including regulatory impact analyses and non-
governmental or academic studies, the point remains as to the sample of regulations 
reviewed by Morrall.  While the nature of the sample cannot be fully resolved, some 
insight can be gained by looking at an EPA (U.S. EPA, 1987) report on its use of benefit-
cost analysis in the years 1981 to 1985.  During that time EPA reports issuing 925 
proposed regulations and 1,021 final regulations (with many proposed regulations also 
counted  as becoming final).  Of those regulations, regulatory impacts analyses were 
prepared for the 15 regulations considered “major” by EPA  and hence appropriate for a 
review by OIRA.  It is clear that the data omit over 95% of the regulations promulgated 
by EPA although individually they are relatively small
6.  Within the set of 15 major 
regulations; two were included in the Morrall sample (Land disposal ban and Asbestos).  
EPA reported that most major rules did not quantify expected lives saved and so would 
not be an expected part of the sample with at least the exception of used oil regulation 
under RCRA, new source performance review for surface coal mines, and national 
ambient air quality standards for particulate matter although the analytical focus on the 
latter had been on a per unit of pollution removed.    
In general, as long as the sample is not biased in its selection of unusually high or 
low-cost regulations, then there should be no bias imparted to the statistical analysis of 
                                                                                                                                                 
calculations underlying the estimates. 
5 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA 947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 1991) 
6 EPA’s recent concern with cumulative environmental impacts may have a parallel in its own regulatory 
impact when it issues numerous small regulations.   15
this study.  Although Heinzerling presents examples of excluded air regulations that may 
be quite cost effective, at the same time other examples exist of excluded regulations that 
were not cost effective.  Tengs et al. provide 587 estimates of the cost effectiveness of  
life-saving interventions, 151 of them regulatory and 310 of them relating to health care, 
which add cases of both cost effective and ineffective interventions.    
Heinzerling surfaced a second concern for underinclusion: those risks that have not 
been proposed for regulation.  This question returns to the purpose of the analysis.  If the 
purpose is to set priorities by considering the full set of potential regulations, then indeed 
the reported regulations are underinclusive.  If one focuses on the performance of the 
regulatory system as including those problems it has for whatever reason, seen fit to 
attack, then the revealed preference of the system is captured in what actually occurs.  
Unregulated opportunities represent an opportunity cost of action, just as potential 
opportunities to shift resources among many kinds of risk reducing categories represent 
an opportunity cost.  It is a good question, but not germane to the present analysis on the 
impact of Administrations and OIRA on rules actually developed.   
 
4.3  Discounting 
  A lengthy discussion by Heinzerling (1995, p. 2039) on the appropriateness of 
discounting concludes with a table titled “Competing Estimates of the Costs of Various 
Risk Reducing Regulations Per Life Saved.” While different estimates of risk reduction 
are an element in some cases, the unifying difference in the estimates presented by 
Heinzerling and Morrall appears to be discounting, in particular, the practice of 
discounting lives saved.  Her suggested corrections to the data are not accepted in this   16
study for reasons primarily economic and legal, but also informed by prior statistical 
analysis. 
Heinzerling asserts that “the decision to discount lives saved in the future involves a 
choice about values, as to which reasonable people may disagree.”  This critique can be 
viewed as a question regarding whether any special credence can or should be attached to 
expert or professional consensus.  First, a distinction should be made between an 
individual’s values and the aggregate interaction of those values sought by economists. 
Individuals when acting on their own behalf are indeed expected to have their own 
values.  Those different values for goods and services interact in the market place where a 
price yields a balance between all the different values.  In just such a manner economists 
consider that some positive level of discounting is an observed social outcome of 
individual time preferences.   There is no ambiguity that the professional standard for 
economists requires discounting.  Morrall’s data would not be accepted among the vast 
majority of mainstream economists without discounting.  While the parallel is not exact, 
a similar professional offense for a lawyer may be preparing a case without researching 
precedent.   Some variation could be accepted among economists as to the specific rate of 
discount.  However, Morrall, as a federal and more specifically an OMB employee 
unsurprisingly uses OMB’s discount rate identified in guidance for the preparation of 
regulatory impact analyses.  In such a situation to avoid discounting would have made 
Morrall professionally negligent in the court of economic opinion and inconsistent with 
Federal guidelines.  An individual may certainly apply any form or rate of discounting to 
their own decisions; an individual representing good or best practice of their profession 
does not have that flexibility.    17
The question of discounting in environmental regulation has also been commented on 
in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA [947 F.2d 1201 (5
th Cir. 1991)], whose subject was an 
asbestos regulation that was remanded to the Agency.  The decision stated: 
“Although various commentators dispute whether it ever is 
appropriate to discount benefits when they are measured in human 
lives, we note that it would skew the results to discount only costs 
without according similar treatment to the benefits side of the 
equation….Because the EPA must discount costs to perform its 
evaluations properly, the EPA also should discount benefits to 
preserve an apples-to-apples comparison, even if  this entails 
discounting benefits of a non-monetary nature.”   
 
Heinzerling’s alternative of not discounting is inconsistent with this finding from a 
legal source usually accorded some deference and in a setting where both costs and 
benefits were being considered.   
Finally, Hahn (1996)  developed a database that includes the Morrall data as well as 
information on other regulations.  He importantly notes the potential variability in cost-
effectiveness computations, as when using life years or lives saved as the unit of benefit.  
Finally, he carries out a statistical analysis that pools his data, somewhat less adjusted 
from the EPA data but still discounted, with the Morrall data.  His results led to a 
statistical rejection that the intercept of the Morrall data differed from the rest of the 
data
7.  Consequently there is some statistical evidence that the concerns of Heinzerling, 
other than discounting, do not statistically affect the cost-per-life-saved data. 
                                                 
7 Hahn also carried out a Chow or F test for pooling of data which did not reject pooling.   18
As a result of the above review, the analysis carried out in the following section 
recodes or deletes 12 of the potential 73 observations based on Heinzerling’s critique as 
indicated in Table 1.  Values are adjusted to 1992 dollars.
8 
 
5.0    Results 
In keeping with some earlier analysis by Morrall, descriptive statistics of the cost-
per-life-saved data set are presented in Table 2 for different subsets of the data. 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics – Cost-per-life-saved 
Sample  Cases  Mean 
Mil. 1992$ 




1.  Total data set  69         94,320  735,992  .1  6,116,100 
2.  All final rules  49  129,401  873,333  .1  6,116,100 
3.  Final rules, pre-OIRA 
(before 1981) 
13  36 
 
58  .1  178 
4.  Final rules, post OIRA 
(after 1981) 
36  176,117  1,018,598  .3  6,116,100 
5.  Rejected rules  7  3,393  7,797  9.3  21,059 
 
 
As a harbinger of more elaborate tests, in contrast with means first reported in 
1986 by Morrall, the cost effectiveness of final regulations deteriorated after 1981 (rows 
3 and 4) when OIRA was created, although later analysis fails to indicate any simple time 
trend.  The standard deviation of rules also increased since the creation of OIRA.  Those 
rules that were rejected (column 5) are seen as likely inefficient from an economic 
perspective (their minimum cost-per-life-saved was 9.3 million dollars) but their mean 
and maximum values are less than that for the post-OIRA sample.   
                                                 
8 Heinzerling identified some inconsistencies with the inflation adjustments made by the Office of 
Management and Budget in its 1992 version of the Morrall table.  Where possible I have avoided using the   19
 
5.1  Rejection Hypothesis 
  Using only data on final and rejected regulations (56 cases), the first observation 
is that the presence of OIRA is perfectly correlated with rules being rejected (or 
withdrawn), as all rejected rules in the sample occurred after 1981.  While perhaps an 
artifact of the sample in which about 23 percent of the rules are pre-1981, the finding is 
consistent with the power of rejection as a success story for regulatory improvement as 
the rejected rules were among those likely deemed inefficient. 
However, it is also meaningful to ask if higher cost-per-life saved or other factors 
affect the probability of rejection.  Statistical results for a Probit analysis are presented in 
Table 3.  The dependent variable records whether the rule was final (0) or rejected (1).  
Only independent variables for which there is variation among rejected rules can be used, 
hence OIRA and health cannot be used as explanatory variables (all rejected rules were 
post OIRA and health related.)    
In a minimalist approach, columns 2 and 3 report the results of trying to predict 
rejection by the cost-per-life-saved, either in its level or its logarithm  The statistical 
significance of the logarithm of cost-per-life-saved in column 3 indicates that higher cost-
per-life saved does increase the probability of rejection in contrast to the level of cost-
per-life-saved in column 2.  However, no rule actually rejected is correctly predicted by 
the equation when the threshold for rejection is a predicted probability greater than .5.  
Also, the impact of a higher cost-per-life-saved on the probability of rejection is non-
linear.   When evaluated at the mean of the sample (cost-per-life-saved of 20 million 
dollars), an increase in cost-per-life-saved up to 54 million dollars increases the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1992 version of the table and based the data on the other sources.   20
probability of rejection by about 2.4 percent
9.  Thus, while (the logarithm of) cost-per-
life-saved is a statistically significant determinant of rejection, it may not be policy 
significant as cost-per-life-saved must increase by very large amounts in order to change 
the probability of rejection by a large factor. 
 
Table 3:  Probability of Rejection 
Column 1 
Variable 
Column 2:   
  


















X  -.21e-05 
(-.15) 
X 
Log. of  cost-per-
life-saved 
X  .139* 
(2.36) 
X  .072 
(.98) 








         
Log. Likelihood  -20.9  -18.2  -15.5  -15.6 
Number correctly 
predicted of 7 
0  0  3  0 
coeff/std.err  in parentheses, * if signficant at the 5% level, ** if significant at the 10% level. 
  
  In parallel with other studies of regulation, we may ask if variables other than cost 
affect the probability of rejection.  Columns 4 and 5 present results with the interaction of 
EPA and health (as opposed to safety) based rules, and the budget of likely trade-groups 
opposing the regulation.  The first variable is suggested by the work of Hahn, the second 
by Magat, et al.  Adding these terms increases the prediction capability for the equation 
using the level of cost (column 4) and decreases the significance of the logarithm of cost.  
The best equation for predicting rejection is column 4 which includes the interaction of 
                                                 
9 The “marginal impact” for a Probit model is F(XB)BI where F is the normal density function.   21
EPA and health-related rules, combined with rules opposed by well funded trade 
associations.  As with cost, however, changes in budgets of trade associations must be 
very large to change the probability of rejection by a few percent.   
  Thus results regarding rejection are mixed.  The rejected rules appear to be 
economically inefficient and occurred during the existence of executive office review.  
However, the particular rules rejected are better predicted by whether or not they were 
EPA health rules, combined with the budgetary resources to oppose that agency instead 
of being predicted by continuously decreasing economic performance.     
 
5.2  Differences between proposed and final regulations 
  Secondly, consider the question of whether OIRA affects the estimated economic 
performance of regulations from the time of the proposal to its finalization.  In the data 
set there are 8 matches of proposed and final regulations during OIRA’s tenure (there is 
only one match of a proposed and rejected regulation.)  In six cases there is not change in 
economic performance.  In only two cases, the grain dust elevator rule and the 
formaldehyde exposure rule, do the cost-per-life saved estimates change between the 
proposed and the final rule.  In fact, the-cost-per-life saved  increases between the 
proposed and the final rule for these two cases.  While there are too few observations for 
a statistical analysis, the changes that exist are in the wrong direction for efficiency.  The 
suggested effect of OIRA is either no impact (6 cases) or to increase (2 cases) the 
estimated cost-per-life-saved between the proposed and final rule.  This finding only 
hints at what may be an unintended effect of OIRA.  OIRA may serve the role of getting   22
agencies to provide information in a particular format and providing a critical review of 
estimation methods as opposed to significantly altering major regulatory designs.   
 
5.3  Cost effectivness 
  Finally, the preliminary r esult of the lack of impact of OIRA on the cost 
effectiveness of regulation as mentioned in Farrow and Toman, and in Hahn are 
confirmed and extended in Table 4. 
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R Squared  .14  .45  .14  .43 
T statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10% level 
 
  The full models that include the impact of different administrations, type of 
regulation, and trade association budgets on either cost-per-life-saved or the logarithm of 
cost-per-life-saved are shown in columns 2 and 3.  When the level of cost-per-life-saved 
is the dependent variable (column 2), only the budgets of the trade-associations are 
statistically significant and seem to increase the cost-per-life-saved by a large amount,   23
possibly through the budget’s association with the industries that are large and the subject 
of health regulation.  When the logarithm of cost-per-life-saved is used as the dependent 
variable (column 3), health-focused regulations become the sole statistically significant 
determinant o f cost per life-saved.  In each case, the specific Reagan and Bush 
Administrations are insignificant determinants of cost-per-life-saved. Overall, the 
explanatory power of the regressions are relatively low as measured by R -squared.   
Columns 4 and 5 combine the two Republican Administrations into one “OIRA” variable 
which is equivalent to a joint test of significance of the two Administrations.  While 
Budget and Health continue to be significant in their respective equations, OIRA is not 
even close to significance in either equation.  
  These results are consistent with Morrall’s original interpretation—that health 
regulations are significantly more expensive than safety regulations although the effect 
found by Hahn of an added impact of EPA on cancer regulation is not found here.  The 
insignificance both of OIRA and individual administrations expands on previous 
preliminary findings.   
The occasional significance of the budgets of trade associations suggests more 
complex political economic factors at work.  Budgets were seen as significant predictors 
of the probability of rejection, and here they help predict high cost-per-life saved 
regulations.  This provides a hint, perhaps unsurprising, of the simultaneous 
determination of trade-association budget and high cost regulation when looking at the 
two sets of results
10.  
 
                                                 
10 There is only moderate correlation between Budgets and the two cost variables.  The highest correlation 
is .27.   24
6.0  Conclusions 
  This quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of Executive Office review of 
regulations illustrates the usefulness of collecting regulatory performance data from 
Governmental programs.  The data suggest that such review might help to reject some 
uneconomic regulation, but that such rejected regulations have  not been strongly 
correlated with increasing cost-per-life-saved.  Instead, budgets of trade associations and 
health regulations from EPA are important predictors of regulations that are actually 
rejected.  There seems to be either no effect or a perverse effect of Executive Office 
review on the cost-per-life-saved between the proposed and final stages of regulation.  
Finally, Executive Office review does not seem to improve (reduce) the cost-per-life-
saved of regulation. 
  This weak performance record for Executive Office review seems consistent with 
qualitative descriptions of the modest adjustments made in regulations as a result of such 
review.  To speculate somewhat, what does this say about the usefulness of such review?  
First, the actual size of OIRA is relatively small as are preparation costs for regulatory 
analyses.  OIRA’s association with rejecting inefficient rules or influencing minor 
changes may be sufficient to justify economically their existence
11.  Second, such review 
may serve a different purpose than that of directly increasing economic efficiency, even if 
that is one of its stated purposes.  For instance, the review may generate information that 
is useful outside of Executive Office review per se.  Third, just as end-of-pipe treatment   
may not be efficient, so too may end-of-pipe regulatory review be inefficient.   The 
process of producing regulatory benefit-cost analyses, the use of scientific information in   25
agencies, and the role of personnel and bureaucratic organization all continue to be 
possibilities for improving the performance of government through greater investment 
through benefit-cost development and review.  For instance, some progress is occurring 
in the development of computerized templates and bibliographies for benefit-cost 
analysis (Farrow, et al, 2000).  Similarly, it seems odd to this author that Executive 
Orders have created a benefit-cost review for proposed regulations but there is no 
mandate for a similar review of ongoing regulations through a mechanism such as the 
Governmental Performance and Results Act.  Finally, some individuals can argue that if 
the net benefits of review are small, then such review is only a facade and could be 
omitted.  It is this author's view that benefit-cost analysis is at the borderline of looking at 
regulation in a different way.  As long as the legal structure of regulation, organizational 
culture, and personnel rest on a non-economic philosophy, then economic arguments will 
be minority voices with only occasional impact.  Changing some or all of the structure, 
culture, and personnel may lead to a different conclusion. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
11 OIRA’s new format of reporting the net present value of regulations could be used in a similar analysis to 
that above to determine if OIRA increases the net present value of regulations.  Such potential benefits 
could be compared to the costs of the process.   26
References 
Congleton, Roger, ed. (1996)  The Political Economy of Environmental Protection, 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
 
Cropper, Maureen,  et al. (1992),  "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation," The 
Journal of Political Economy, 100(1). 
 
Farrow, Scott, et al, (2000), FERET:  The Fast Environmental Regulatory Evaluation 
Tool, Introduction and User's Guide to Beta Test Software, Carnegie Mellon University 
and the University of Washington. 
 
Farrow, Scott (1991),“Does Analysis Matter?  Economics and Planning in the 
Department of the Interior,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, pp. 172-176. 
 
Farrow, Scott and Mike Toman (1999) “Commentary: Benefit-Cost Analysis,” 
Environment   41, p. 45.  See also Farrow and Toman (1999), “Using Environmental 
Benefit-Cost Analysis to Improve Government Performance,” Environment , 41, pp. 12-
15;33-37. 
 
Hahn, Robert (1996), "Regulatory Reform:  What do the numbers tell us?"  In Risks, 
Costs, and Lives Saved, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Hahn, Robert (1999), Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government’s Numbers, 
AEI/Bookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 99-6, American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. 
 
Heinzerling, Lisa (1995), "Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions," Yale Law Journal , 
107, pp. 1081-2070. 
 
Hoagland,  Porter and Scott Farrow (1996), "Planning v. Reality:  Political and Scientific 
Determinants of Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales", in The Political Economy of 
Environmental Protection , ed. Roger D. Congleton,  University of Michigan Press. 
 
Lutter,  Randall and John F. Morrall, III (1994),"Health-health Analysis:  A New Way to 
Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, pp. 43-66. 
 
Magat, Wesley A., Alan J. Krupnick and Winston Harrington (1986), Rules in the 
Making: A Statistical Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior, Resources for the Future, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
McFadden, Dan 1976, “The Revealed Preferences of a Government 
Bureaucracy:Empirical Evidence,” Bell Journal of Economics, 7, pp. 55-72. 
 
McGarity, Thomas (1991), Reinventing Rationality:  The Role of Regulatory Analysis in 
the Federal Bureaucracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.   27
 
Morgenstern, Richard ed. (1997), Economic Analysis at the EPA, Resources for the 
Future, Washington, D.C.   
Morrall,  John F. III (1986), "A Review of the Record," Regulation, Nov./Dec. pp. 25-34.  
 
National Academy of Public Administration (1995), Setting Priorities, Getting Results, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Office of Management and Budget (1992) , Budget of the United States,  Part 2, p. 370.  
 
Office of Management and Budget (1997-1999), Report to Congress, Costs and Benefits 
of Regulation.    
 
Office of Technology Assessment (1995), Environmental  Policy Tools, Washington, 
D.C.  
 
Shane, Peter (1995), "Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The 
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking," Arkansas Law Review, 48, pp. 161-214. 
 
Tengs, Tammy, et al., (1996), "The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments 
in Life Saving,” in Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved,  ed. Robert Hahn, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1987), EPA’s Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis: 
1981-1986, EPA-2230-05-87-028, Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, Table. 4-3. 
 
U.S. EPA (1997), Final Report to Congress on Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 
1970-1990.  Document EPA410-R-97-002, Washington, DC. 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1998), Regulatory Reform: Agencies Could Improve 
Development, Documentation, and Clarity of Regulatory Impact Analyses,  GAO/RCED-
98-142, Washington, D.C.  
 
Van Houtven, George (1996),“Bureaucratic Discreation in Environmental Regulations” 
in The Political Economy of Environmental Protection, Roger Congleton, Ed., University 
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip (1996), "The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments," in Risks, Costs, 
and Lives Saved, ed. Robert Hahn, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip and James T. Hamilton (1999), "Are Risk Regulators Rational?" The 
American Economic Review, 89, pp. 1010-1027. 
 